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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH
A. l\L HAFEY and BARNEY DECORA,

d b a B A ~I INVESTMENT COMpANY, a Partnership,
Pla~ntiffs and Respondents,
vs.
PAUL IIA\'"ENS COMPANY, a corporation,
Defendant and Thirty-Party
Plaint~!! and Respondent

Case No.
9692

vs.
NEW ZEALAND INSURANCE COMpANY, a corporaton,
Third-Party Defendant and Appellant.
DEFENDANT· AND RESPONDENT PAUL HAVENS
C0~1:P ANY'S BRIEF
ST_A_TEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE
This is an action by the Plaintiff against the Defend8Jlt and Third-Party Plaintiff Paul Havens' Company,
for damage to a building sustained 'vhile it was being
moved by the Defendant. The Defendant was to move
plaintiffs' building. Plaintiff alleges that the Defendant
"·as negligent and as the approximate result thereof the
building "Tas damaged. Defendant denies he was negligent and alleges the building collaPsed. The Defendant
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made the New Zealand Insurance Company a ThirdParty Defendant because they had issued a Transportation Policy, and if Defendant was liable, it was covered
by the policy up to $5,000.00.
The parties will be referred to as they appeared in
the Court below to avoid confusion and because that is
the way Appellant designated them in its brief.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
The case was tried to the Court. Plaintiff was awarded judgment against the Defendant, Paul Havens Company, for $8,802.93. The Defendant was awarded judgment against the New Zealand Insurance Company, Third
Party Defendant, for $5,000.00, the policy limit.
RELIEF SOUGH'T ON APPEAL
Defendant seeks a reversal of the judgment against
it in favor of Plaintiff, but if the judgment is not reversed, that the judgment of the Defendant and against
the Third-Party Defendant be sustained.
STATEl\fENT OF FACTS
In July of 1958 Plaintiffs asked Defendant if it
was interested in giving them a figure to move a number
of buildings. One of the building was a masonry type of
building and the building was so constructed that it
could be made into t'Yo buildings by re1noving a common
wall and by removing the outside walls and putting in
studding and putting on new sheeting. (T. 77 and 78.)
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Thus, n1aking it into a fra1ne building. Practically all
that \Vould re1nain of the original building was the roof
and the floor. Plaintiff~ asked Paul Havens in July
of l~);)S \\"hat the value of the building was at Stansbuy,
\Vyon1ing. He told the1n $3,500.00 for the two buildings
('T. 2S3). The one building \Vas 75 feet long and 29 feet
4 inche~ \vide, called the Store Building. The other was
96 (95) feet long by 32 feet \\ride, and is referred to as
the Comrnunity I-Iall Building. (T. 73, T. 129, T·. 284.)
Two years later Plaintiffs contacted Defendant by
phone to see if it would still move the building and they
were told that the labor cost had gone up and that the
price would have to be increased by 10% ('T. 288).
Art Hafey asked I>aul Havens to come to Stansbury,
which he did and Defendant and Plaintiffs again looked
at the building. They went over the road after which
l\Ir. Havens told Plaintiffs (T. 287):
''I could move the building over the road if
he could get a large bulldozer in order to move
sorne rocks ·off of some of the shorter turns and
off of some of the ups and downs hills there.
They said they :knew \vhere they could get a D-8."
'~Q.

And were they going to furnish the D-8 ~
"A. ,,. . ell, that \vas my understanding that
they \Y·ould pay for the D-8 and that - in order
to pay for the extra cost of moving the extra
distance.

"Q. And you told them-what did you tell
them about if you could move the building or not~
"A. I told them that if they could get the
D-8 we would try to take the building over it."
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Mr. IIavens told plaintiffs they would have to put
in studding and put sheeting on the walls.
The Store Building was to be moved east of Rock
Springs and it "~as to travel over part of the same road
that the Community Hall Building 'vas to travel. The
Community Hall Building \ras moved by going fron1
Standsbury, which is built on a slope, (T. 289) down the
Stansbury Road, turn at the junction of the Stansbury
and the Winton Road. Go down the Winton Road to the
junction of the Winton Road and highway 187. Turn at
the junction of the 'Vinton Road and highway 187; go
north on highway 187 to a one-mile cut-off road. Turn
on it and go west onto old 187 and then proceed down
old 187 and make a turn onto the dirt road and from
there to Rock Springs.
T·hey cribbed around the turn at the junction of the
Winton Road and highway 187 and around the turn from
the cut-off road to old 187, which is a customary and
regular way for housemovers to cross barro\Y pits or
other depressions, and is a standard practice of housemovers. The testimony of Ira '':ells, who has had a lot
of exPerience with housemoving (T. 296) and the testimony 'Of Jay Bleazard (T. 272), and also the testimony
of Allison ( T. 184). He had done it (cribbing) a lot.
The dollies had to be set out as \Yide as possible
because of the 'vidth of the building and the building
would ride better if the dollies \Yere \Yide ( T. 183).
A detailed description of the housemoving equipment
is found at T. 256 to T. 261.
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The equipn1ent had been used to 1nove larger buildings than this one (T. 238, 284, offered Exhibit D-25,
D-~G, D-27, D-28). The original rocker or bolster was
ntade of wood reinforced with three railroad rails (T.
~SD). A s1nall crack appeared ( T. 289). A ne\v bolster was
brought from Salt Lake City and replaced the old. The
house 1noving equipment consisted of a four-wheel trailer
unit \vith a fifth-wheel located in the center. The fifthw·heel pennitted the front trailer unit to turn indepe·ndently of the rear "rheels and to steer the vehicle. A
bolster or rocker was secured to the fifth-wheel with a
pin (T. 257, T. 258). Approximately 50 feet to the rear
of the bolster and on each side of the building was located
a set of dollies.. Each dolly consists of four wheels,
approximately 5lf2 to 6 feet wide T. 266). A set of
springs permitted the wheels on the dollies to move up
and down on an uneven road, so that the building will
stay level and not twist. ( T. 180, 181, 246, 247, 266, 27~
and 297). All buildings will sway when they are being
moved, but the dollies and the bolster allow it to move
evenly on the rocke·r ( T. 246, 247, 266, 267, 297). From
the outside wheel of one dolly to the outside wheel of
the other dolly \Yas 23 feet (T. 253). Large steel beams
strengthened by spring timbers (T. 240, 241, 289) extend from the bolster to each of the dollies, and they
\\·ere secured by a chain ('T. 259, 260). The building
rides free upon the main timbers., its weight being sufficient to carry it (T. 260).
The Community Hall Building was rolled off the
foundation and put onto the moving equipment. They
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Put the main timbers under the building and put spring

timbers under the main timbers by pulling the spring
timbers down and by chaining it on each end so that
it pulled up against the main timbers (T. 241).
When they started to pull the house and had moved
about one-half the distance of the building, they decided
that the rocker wasn't strong enough (T. 237) and that
it would put the weight on the rails (T. 289). So they
sent to Salt Lake City for a new rocker. This had no
detrimental effect ·on the building whatsoever (T. 237,
T. 290). Defendant had good equipment and it had been
used to move other houses of that length or longer and
there was nothing wrong with the equipment (T. 238).
The first night the building was left at Reliance
Junction. The next night they took it to the Junction
of Winton Road and parked it on the one-mile cut-off
road. Nothing was done to damage the building according to the testimony of Jay Jones and Jay Eleazer (T.
239, 251, 271). Witness Allison did not see anything
about the house that caused him to be concerned that
it was going to collapse. It looked in good condition
and was able to be moved when it was parked on the
cut-off road (T. 185).
The next day they went over the one-mile cut-off
road and onto old 187 by cribbing around the turn. The
building was kep~t level by the cribbing (T. 240, 241).
After they got around the corner of the one-mile
cut-off road and old 187 they got the building straight
in line down the road. The wheels were on the road.
They had shoulders on either side of the wheels. The
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front "·hPPI ~Pt "·as in th<' center of the asphalt on the
high,vay and thP t \Yo rear dollie~ \\·ere both on the road
~-t-1, ~-t-:2). There \Va~ lnore road beyond the "yheels
(T. :2-t-2). ThPre \Vere dual dollies, two sets for each
\\·heel on each side. ThrPe out of the four wheels or
tirP~ on the dollies \Yere on the paved road (T. 242).
Road ~ 1 to :Z3 feet "·ide (T. 200) Dollies 23 feet from
out~i<lP \rheel to outside \\·heel and the road \vas 23 feet
\Vide \Yhere the debrie was ,and where the building collapsed. ( T. 200)
Approximately 300 or 400 feet down the road from
the turn, \vitness Jay Jones was walking from one side
of the road to the other and walked bac:kwards guiding
the building. There was nothing unusual and the building looked alright at that time and there was nothng
\vhich gave them any indication there was anything wrong
or any unusual strain (T. 252'). Jay Jones had just been
under the building and if he thought there was anything
\Yrong "~ith the building, he wouldn't have been under
it. (T. 267). The first indication that anything was
\Vrong with the. building was when he walked from the
"?est side of the road to the east. He sa\v the building
start to lean in the back. He hollered to stop the truck,
but before they could stop the building kept on leaning
over, fell into the borro·w· pit and the \\'"heels started
jun1ping over on the side of the road just like it was
pulling the \\'"heels over \vith it (T. 242, 243, 261).

cr.

T. 2G2, T 263 the Court asked questions:
•~Q. I have a question, sir. \\lfien the whole
-\vhen everything had stopped and the building
had finally collapsed, did any part of it collapse
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on top of the dollies and your equipment, or did
it all go to the side~
"A. It pulled the one set of dollies with it,
and one timber slid with the building down into
the borrow pit.
"Q. Those dollies were under "A. Underneath the building, yes, sir.

"Q. How did you get them out¥
"A. We winched them out. They came up
through the floor of the building.
''Q. Nothing fell on the other set of dollies T
"A. N o, s1r.
.
"Q. .And nothing collapsed over your bolster
in the front part~
"A. N o, s1r.
.
"Q. That all slid off~
"A. Just slid off.
''Q. Did the building
did that part of
the building go onto its side before it hit the
ground~

"A. It seemed to just lean over and flop
on its side, yes, sir. The roof flew out beyond
the building.

"Q.
floorY
"A.

The roof didn't collapse down on the
N o, s1r.
.

Jay Bleazard \\yas behind the building. It ""as going
straight down the road (T. 276, T. 277). He started
gathering up the blocks where they had cribbed around
the turn. He heard a funny noise and ran up on the
road. He saw the back part of the top of the building
8
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just kind of leaning. The next thing the building just
raised up as though it \vas a piece of paper and sailed
off,
~~~' T. ~73), and he describes the movement of
the dollies. \Ve quote T. 273:

cr.

~ ~Q.
H

A.

Was there any 1nove1nent of the
Yes, there was.

dollies~

''Q. And \Vhat did they do~
'~A.

\Veil, as I remember, they were jumping. That would be my right side. I was looking
towards the back of the building. The right dollies
\Yere jumping across the highway, just little
jumps, inches at a time (T. 273).
Jay Bleazard was not working for Paul Havens at
the ti1ne of the trial, but for Ira Wells.
\Vi tness Jay Jones testified as to the condi tj nn of
the road and what happened. There was nothing unusual
about the road itself when the building collapsed. There
\\Tas nothing about the road which would indicate that
they \Yere going to have any trouble (T. 268). Mr. Jones
at the time of the trial was working for P. E. Valgardson
and not Paul Havens.
When witness Jay Bleazard was asked about the
equipment (T. 269), the Court said:
~~I

think maybe eounsel "rill agree with you
he doesn't clain1 the equipment was defective after
hearing the evidence so far. Do you make any
contention it \vas~
":\lr. Cra\vford: We don't waive that right,
your Honor.
"~Ir. Kastler: No.
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"C. I will waive it for you. You have found
enough on the equip·ment. There wasn't anything
wrong with the equipment as shown by the evidence·, so you don't need to go further into that."
At the time the building collapsed, the floor was
still partly on the dollies and blocking part of the highway. Jay J·ones and Paul Havens asked lv.Ir. Decora
if he wanted to do anything towards salvaging the building or moving the floor, and he said he didn't have
anything to do with it. He wanted $18,000.00. It was
all up to the Insurance Company (T. 290, T. 245).
After the insurance comp1any denied liability, the
Plaintiff took the material and rebuilt it.

\T·

The Court ~ade no findin..[~~}rz negligen~e·
4?,
T. 46). The Tr1al Court was 11 Je to make fmd1ng 1f
any negligence by the motion asking the Court to
Amend the Findings and l\Iake Additional Fndings (T.
53) first paragraph:
"That the defendant specifically objects that
there has been no findings made of the facts
which constitutes, if any, the negligence of the defendant, and that there can be no recovery without negligence on the part of the defendant."
The insurance policy is Exhibit D-37.
D-25 and D-26 are photographs 'vhich illustrate how
the rocker and the front 'vheel set work. Exhibit D-27
and D-28 are photographs to sho"~ that the equipment
had been used on larger buildings, "~hich Exhibits the
Court refused to admit.

10
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ARGlT~lENT

1\~S\\rERING NI~~'r Zl·~..:\LAND IN~URANCE

COMPANY'S BRIEF
POINT I

Defendant will answer third-party defendant's Argument and \Vill hereafter argue the statement of points
raised by the cross-appeal. Answering Point I found
on page 9 of appellant's brief.
Rule 52-A provides:
~'the

court shall, unless the same are waived, find
the facts speci ally and state separately its conclusions of law thereon."
1

The appellant cited in its brief the case of West v.
Standard Fuel Co., 81 U. 300, 17 P. 2d 292 and the case
of Brown v. Johnson, 43 U. 1, 6, 134 P. 590. Although
these cases were decided before the New Rules, Defendant does not disagree with their holding.
Defendant does not contend the general rule to be
other\vise and we are assigning as error the failure of
the courts to n1ake specific find.ings which we will set
out in this Brief in our Arguments on our cross-appeal,
but that Finding No. II, that the defendant Paul Havens
Company had an insurance policy with the New Zealand
Insurance Company, ''Thich provided for coverage for
this accident is a sufficient finding to comply with the
rule and that the facts of the case support this finding
that the evidence shows that the back part of the building
started to tip and that the pressure of the building made
11
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the dollies jump across the road. One of the dollies
finally went down into the borro\v pit, with one of the
timbers and that under the cases hereafter cited by
defendant, the building lost its equilibrium and there
was an overturning of the vehicle.
POINT II
WAS THERE AN OVERTURNING OF THE VEHICLE
UNDER THE TERMS OF THE INSURANCE POLICY.

The only and undisputed evidence shows that the
building started to S\vay. That the dollies jumped across
the road and that one of the dollies and one of the
timbers went into the borrow pit, and that the roof and
walls of the buiding \vent into and over the borrow pit,
the floor remaining partly on the road. These are the
undisputed facts so there is no question about sustaining the burden of proof.
The following cases hold that there was an overturning of the vehicle :
In the case of Carl Ingalls, Inv. v. Hartford Fire
Ins. Co., 31 P. 2d 414, 416, 137 Cal. App. 741 (Cal. 1934),
holds that \vhen a truck hit a soft shoulder in the road
causing the truck to partially tip over spilling contents,
but with load removed righted itself, there was "overturning" of truck within insurance policy covering transportation of materials sinre it had been sufficiently tipped over to spill contents. We quote from page 416 first
column:
"As was said in Granger v. New Jersey Ins.
Co. ,108 Cal. App. 290, 291 P. 698, 700: ~A risk
fairly within contemplation is not to be avoided
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by any nice distinction or artificial refinement
in the use of words.'

• • • • •
''lt was the merchandise rather than the vehicle which was insured and the safety of the
merchandise was the object of tallting out the insurance.* • * •
"The effect of an overturning on the merchandise, which may thereby be dumped on the
ground, is the same whether that ove·rturning be
complete or only partial, so long as it is sufficient
to cause the injury.
''In ordinary parlance, anything has been
overturned 'vhen it has been sufficiently tipped
over to spill its contents."
Moore v. Western Assur. Co. of Toronto, Canada,
195 SE 558, 559, 186 SC 260 Texas 1950. Where wheels
on right side of truck loaded with fruit sank down to
the axle, a distance of two or three feet, in the earth of
the shoulder of highway causing load to shift its weight
and sideboards of truck were thereby broken and fruit
"?as precipitated to the ground damage to the fruit was
caused by "overturning" of truck within policy providing
for payment to insure on insured liability as a contract
or common carrier for loss or damage to goods cauBed
by ~'overturning'' of the motor truck and/ or trailer
since a slight overturning is as much of an ·overturning
as a complete overturning. We quote as follows :
In the construction of insurance contracts, it
is vitally essential that the courts do not ignore
the fact that the primary object of all insurance
is to insure, and that, in cases of doubt, uncertain-
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ty, manifest, ambiguity, or susceptibility of two
equally reasonable interpretations, since the language used is the selection and arrangen1ent of
the insurer, such contracts must be liberally construed in favor of the insured.''

J ac.k v. Standard Marine Ins. Co., 205 P. 2d 351,
8 A.L.R. 2d, 1-!26. When the diesel shovel was by its
operator caused to advance up a slight incline the crane
of the shovel swung back beyond vertical position and
suddenly fell backwards damaging the cab of the shovel.
T'he shovel had lost its equilibrium and it was an overturning of the vehicle. Insurance company contending
unless the mechanical part itself turned over or losses
its equilibrium no overturning, the court held against
the insurance company's contention. This case is the
leading case on the subject. It dscusses the Orlando v.
~1:anhattan Fire and ~larine Ins. Co. cited by the appellant and distinguished it on the facts. Also discusses the
two cases that we have just cited and holds that the
insurance contract should be so interpreted as to cover
the insured. We quote as follows:
~'

It would seem that, for purposes of such an
insurance policy as that before us, words contained in the policy should be construed in view
of the purpose of the policy; namely, to protect
the insured's p·roperty against loss by certain
hazards. * * * * Once a vehicle loses its equilibrium
and the overturning process has commenced and
proceeded beyond the po"~er of those in charge of
the vehicle to stop its progress, it ":rould be unimportant ,,,.hether the vehicle turned over and
over, rolling do\vn a hillside, or can1e to rest on
a flat surface in an exactly horizontal p·ositon, or
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eautP to re~t a short distance above the horizontal

or at any other angle. It should be held that the
vPhicle had overturned or upset, \\rithin the meaning and intent of such a policy.
There is another principle applying to contrath; of insurance to the effect that if they are so
dra\vn a~ to require interpretation and fairly
~usceptible of t\vo different conclusions, the one
\vill be adopted n1ore favorable to the insured;
and "yill be liberally construed in favor of the
object to be aeco1nplished and conditions and pro-visions therein \vill be strictly construed against
the insurer, as they are issued upon printed forms
prepared by experts at the instance of the insurer,
in the preparation of which the insured has no
H

VOICe.

In the case of a contract of insurance, the
contract is to be interpreted in the light of its
nature, in vie\v of its purpose as such, and with a
considerable degree of liberality in favor of the
insured and against the insurer by reason of its
having fra1ned the contract. A risk fairly within
conte1nplation is not to be avoided by any nice
distinction or artificial refinen1ent in the use of
words.
''Obviously, the shovel and boom lost equilibrium in the course of the accident which resulted
in the damage for \vhich respondent seeks recovery under the policy. The evidence shows that the
shovel suffered an upset or overturning, resulting
in damage to the insured machine.''
H

The case of l\lereury Ins. Co. v. \T arner, 231 SW 2d
519 Texas 1950. Drilling mast being transported over
rough eountry road, king pin on fifth wheel broke and
truck and trailer beca1ne detached and drilling mast fell
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to the ground damaging drilling mast. Court held that
there was an overturning of the vehicle and allowed
them to recover, and cite the Carl Ingalls, Inc. case and
states:
''The subject is annotated in 8. A.L.R. 2d
1433, 1436, where it is stated that according to all
the cases in point a comPlete overturning is not
essential.
"* * * * In this case, the 1nast which had been
supported by both the truck and trailer was left
unsupported on one end and when the truck and
trailer became disconnected, the mast still resting
on the trailer tipped for\\rard and fell to the
ground with the resultant damage thereto. This
tipping of the mast on the trailer and the resultant fall was a partial overturn and in our opinion
comes within the meaning and intent of the term
'overturn' as used in the policy.''
·The case of Employees Liability Assur. Corp. v.
Groninger & King, 299 SW 2d 175, Texas 1957. A truck
carrying caterpillar tractor made a sudden stop, broke
the chain and the tractor being carried on the truck fell
off onto the road and court held it to be an overturning
of the vehicle under policy insuring against overturning
of conveyance.
Grimh v. Western Fire Insurance Co., 92 NW. 2d
259, Wis. 1958. A tractor fell into a sink hole when it
broke through the frozen ground into mud and water,
nosed down and tipped to the right. The language of the
policy in this case is much stronger than in the other
cases; but nevertheless, holds that there· was an overturning of the vehicle and they quote fron1 the cases that
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\Ve havp

her(~tofore

cited in our Brief. ..:-\.lso states as

follO\V8:
H'rhe Jack deri8ion and others are cited in
;>..\ .:\In. J ur. Autoinobile Insurance, see. 5-l-, page
.)~l, in ~upport of a statPlllent that, ~ .:\ co1nplete
overturning of the vehitlP is not neeessary to
eo1ne "'"ithin coverage against ··up8et" or '"overturning.'' The real test is "\vhether or not the
vehicle preserved its equilibrium.' "
rrhird-Party Defendants rely upon the Orlando v.
~Ianhattan Fire and ~Iarine Ins. Co., ±2 NYS 2d, 228.
The ()rlando Case "\Yas discussed in the Jack v. Standard
~Iarine Ins. Co., 205 P. 2d 351, 8 A.L.R. 2d 1426. The
Court refused to follow the Orlando case. In the Orlando
Case there is a dissenting opinion, which has the same
reasoning as in the cases which ''Te have cited in our
Brief, and cite8 the Ingalls and the ~Ioore Case, 'vhich
we have discussed above.
Third-Party Defendant cites Old Colony Insurance
Co. v. Anderson, 246 F. 2d 102 (lOth Cir. 1957). This
case does not discuss particularly the "\vording "overturning" but discusses the proposition that after a drilling unit fell off the truck and onto the ground, then
the drilling mast collided 'vith another truck and whether
or not the truck itself carrying the drilling unit, had to
be hit before there would be liability. The Court pointed
out that there is a split of authorities on this particular
subject and it is a proposition which is not involved in
the instant case.
Che1nistrand Corp. v. Maryland Gas Co., 98 So. 2d
1 ( .A.la. 1957). In this case an iron ring broke allowing
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goods that were riding on the tailgate and fastened to
the truck to fall from the van, and the goods fell off the
truck as it proceeded down the road. The facts are not
similar to the instant case, where the entire building
overturned and one set of dollies and one timber went
into the borrow pit. The Court said:
''It is immaterial where there was a partial
or a complete overturning of the vehicle so long
as the articles being transporated were damaged
as a result of the vehicle losing its equilibrium
caused by an insured risk."
The Third-Party Defendant cites the case of Crowley
v. New Hampshire Fire Ins. Co., 130 A. 2d 276. The
machine fell off the truck while it was moving. It is
similar to the Chemistrand Corp. Case where the goods
fell off the back of the tailgate. The case is distinguishable on the facts.
The Third-Party Defendant makes statements in his
Brief and some of the witnesses make statements about
the twisting of the building. These are not born out by
the physical facts. ....t\.fter the house is on the housemoving
equipment, it is physically impossible for there to be
a twisting. It "\\~1 rock but not tvvist. Any of the testimony or any state1nent to the contrary, is against the
physical facts and is not \vorthy of belief.
This is an insurance policy. It does not make any
difference what caused the dollies and the timbers and
the house to tip into the barrow pit. The fact is there was
an overturning of the vehicle \Yithin the rule laid down
by the cases we have cited.
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The house, the timbers, the dollies and the front
\\'heel set constitute the vehicle.
llefendant contends that there is speculation and
:5urn1ise about the overturning of the vehicle. The evidence sho"·8 that the vehicle did overturn and there is
no presu1nption to be indulged in whatsoever because
there is direct testhnony as to exactly what happened.
rrhe building and the houselnoving equipment all
lost its equilibriwn so that nothing could be done to
prevent it from falling into the borrow pit. This is insurance and the reason or cause of the overturning of
the building is immaterial.
Defendant contends that any finding of overturning
must necessarily be based on speculation or surmise.
There is no sur1nise as to \Vhat happened. There were two
\Yitnesses \Yho sa.,,· the building tip· over and we do not
disagree \Yith the cases cited by Plaintiff holding that a
finding of fact could not be based upon surmise, gesture,
guess or speculation, nor do we disagree that a presumption cannot stand in the face or facts because the building overturned and the dollies overturned as defined in
the cases. rrhe dollies and the building certainly lost their
equilibrium.
vVhen the Defendant purchased the insurance policy,
they \Yere purchasing Insurance against the possib~ities
that a building would tip over when it was being transported. Becau~P if it is not so insured, then the insurance con1pany \Vas taking premiums for insuring nothmg.
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POINT·S URGED FOR REVERSAL ON CROSS
APPEAL
FIRS;T POINT ON CROSS APPEAL
A contract carrier is not liable unless he is negligent and is not an insurer of the safe delivery of the
goods. The ·Court did not m~ke findings of any acts of
negligence.

SECOND POINT ON CROSS APPEAL
T'he court erred in not admitting certain evidence.

THIRD POINT ON CROSS APPEAL
If Plaintiff was entitled to judgment, the Court did
not use the correct measure of damages.
The detailed Statement of the Points on the Cross
Appeal are found at (T 60, 61.).

ARGUMENT ON CROSS APPEAL
POINT ONE
A CONTRACT CARRIER IS NOT LIABLE UNLESS HE
IS NEGLIGENT AND IS NOT AN INSURER OF THE SAFE
DELIVERY OF THE GOODS. THE COURT DID NOT MAKE
FINDINGS OF ANY ACTS OF NEGLIGENCE.

Defendant 'vill argue all of the assignrnents of erred
together except the failure of the Court to allow the
admssion of certain evidence, and that the Court did
not use the correct measure of damage.
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ThP state1nent of points T 60, 61 except those per-

taining to the .A.d1nission of Evidence and the proper
rneasure of da1nages goes to the proposition that a contraet carrier is not liable unless he is negligent, and is
not an insurer of the safe delivery of the goods. The only
duty he has is to use ordinary care and the same degree
of care that a prudent n1an would use in handling his
O\\·n goods or another house 1nover would do in moving
the building. ~rhe Court and opposing counsel has taken
the vie\v that a con tract carrier is an insurer because
there "·a8 no finding of facts made of any negligence,
notwithstanding that it was specifically called to the
Court's attention in Defendant's ~fotion to .Amend the
Court's Findings and ~fake Additional Findings and
Amend the Judgment (T 53) first paragraph.
Rule 52 (a) provides :
"The Court shall, unless the same are
'vaived, find the facts specially and state separately its conclusions of law thereon."
This point has been argued in Appellant's Brief
and the Court is familiar with this rule of law.
The Rule of La"'" is that a private carrier is not an
insurer, but is only liable for negligence. We cite and
quote the following authorities:
13 C.J.S. section 7± Private Carrier page 138.

"A private carrier is not an insurer but is
liable only for negligence.
A private carrier is not an insurer of the
safety of the goods intrusted to him for trans21
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portation. Where such a carrier makes a special
contract for the carriage of goods ·or one is implied, its liability is governed by the terms of the
contract if specially made, or, if implied, by the
nature of its i1nplication. As a general rule, a
private carrier is under the duty of exercising at
least ordinary care and diligence to prevent damage to the goods intrusted to him for transportation, and is liable ·w·here injury results from his
negligence or failure to use that care, but his
liability is limited to damage or injury resulting
from such causes."
13 C.J .S. Sec. 13, Page 43.

''A private carrier, as a bailee for hire, is
within the law of bailment as to its liabilities."
9 Am. Jur. Section 661, Page 815
"The liability of a private carrier is in general that of an ordinary bailee."
6 Am. J ur. Section 242, Page 345.
"Rule That Ordinary Bailee Is Not Insurer.
- The rule appears ,,~en settled that unles made
so by statute or express contract, an ordinary
bailee, no n1atter to "~hat class he belongs, is not
an insurer of goods delivered into his keeping,
although, as respects a fe'\v special kinds of bailees,
such as common carriers, and innkeepers, it seems
that public polic~~ 1nakes them such. But unless
he is of that class, he is liable only for loss resulting from his failure to exercise, '\vith respect
to the property bailed, the care required by
law of such a bailee. As a general rule, therefore,
except 'vhere a bailee has violated his contract
he will not be liable, in the absence of negligence,
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for loss or injury in respect to the thing bailed,
resulting fro In the inherent nature of the property
itself or some infi11nity thereof, disaster or accidental casualty."
The case of Beatrice Creamery Co. vs. Fisher, 10
NE ~< l ~~0, Illinois 1937 discusses the points raised in
the instant case and holds that:
HAs bailee for hire, the defendants were not
insurers of the safe delivery of the cargo given
into their care, but were obligated to exercise
ordinary care and diligence and be free from
negligence in safely carrying and making delivery of the goods entrusted to their care under
the contract entered into by them. Hinchliffe vs.
Wenig Teaming Co., supra; Langendorf Cloth~ng Co. vs. Fara, 272 Ill. App. 160."
'~The

well-settled rule as to the liability of a
bailee for hire was aptly stated in an opinion by
~lr. Justice Jones, reported in the case of Beard
0·s. Haskell Park Bldg. Corp. 248 Ill, App. 467
at page 473, wherein this court held that 'It is
"~en settled that a bailee for hire is not an insurer
but owes the bailor a duty of ordinary care. As
bailee, appellant was bound to exercise such care
and diligence as every prudent man takes of his
own goods of like character. Ordinary diligence
means that degree of care, attention or exertion,
which under the circumstances, a man of ordinary prudence and discretion "\Yould use in reference to the particular thing, were it his own
property."
Also see JJ eyers vs. Rozan 77 KE 2d 454, 33 TIL
App. 301. In the Utah case of Realty Purchase Co. vs.
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Public Service Commisson, 345 P.2d 606 9Ut.2d. 375,
it states:
''The distinguishing characteristic of the
farmer (common carrier) is that it transports all
persons who request such services. contract carriers "the latter renders a transportation services only to specific parties with whom it has
contracts to do so."
The Wyon1ing Statute 37-131 Carrier Defined.
''Contract Motor Carrier. Any motor carrier other than a co1nmon motor carrier, who engages in the transportation of persons or property by motor vehicle on and over the highways
of the state, for compensation."
A written bid was submitted to move the building
(T 284 and Exhibit 3). There \vas nothing said by plaintiffs or defendant about guaranteeing that the building
would reach its destination. Paul Havens said he would
try to move the building (T 287). Defendant obtained
a permit as a contract carrier from the state of Wyo ..
ming. Defendant's Exhibit D36.
There had to be cribbing done \vhen the building
was moved on and off of the highways. All of the witnesses testified that cribbing is done by all housemovers
and that it is the common and ordinary practice when
they have to go over borrow pits or any depressions
( T184, 272 and 296).
Witness Jay Jones tesified that nothing was wrong
with the house that he could observe "·hen he was working under it "rhen they \\7ere cribbing onto old 187. ('T
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267). There \\~as nothing that he observed as being \VTong
with the house iuunediately before the accident and it
eollapsPd ( T ~G7). There is some testimony of the building being t'visted, but that is against the physical facts
bP('ause 'vhen the building is on the rocker and the dollie~, it R\vays or rock~ but it does not twist. This IS
again~t the physical facts and cannot be believed.
The Court said:
., There \Yasn't anything wrong with the
equipment as shown by the evidence." (T269).
The Plaintiffs were to put up studding and sheetmg.

The mere happening of an accident does not mean
that the defendant was negligent. The preparing of this
house for moving \vas done by the plaintiffs, and it is
apparent that it was not properly prepared.
COURT REFUSED TO ADMIT· EVIDENCE
Plaintiffs offered in evidence Exhibits D25 and
D26. These pictures clearly show the physical facts of
ho\v the front wheel set works and how it can be on
unlevel ground and the building will ren1ain level. In
the record, there is a descrjption of the equipment and
the \\'"ay it works after a house is on the rocker and
the dollies. ( T 297, 271, 246, 247, 250, 261, 266, 267).
It cannot tip and the testimony which says it ",.as tipped
is against the physical facts and could not be believed
for this reason. These Exhibits should have been adInitted in evidence for illustrating purposes. Also Ex-
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hibits D27 and D28 show what orther buildings had heretofore been moved on the same equipment.
The Court allowed pictures of the store building
to be admitted in evidence to show what the building
that collapsed looked like, but refused to allow these
pictures to be admitted in evidence 'vhen they were offered to show that the same equip1nent was used to move
larger buildings.

MEASURE OF DAMAGES
The Court took the view that because there was
a contract to move the building that the value of the
building was to be determined as if it was set on the
foundation. Ths is not the correct measure of damages.
The value of the building would be the value of the
building at Stansbury, Wyoming because the owner of
the building has to assume the risk of moving it.
Jay Jones asked ~fr. Decora if he \vanted him to
move the floor, which was still on the dollies and the
material and thus decrease the damages; but 11r. Decora
took the attitude that he was going to get $18,000.00 out
of the insurance company. This should have been taken
into consideration in determining the amount of damages.
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There was an overturning of the vehicle within the
provi~ion~ of the insurance policy. If the judgment is
sustained in favor of the Plaintiff, then the judgment
as against the Third-I>arty Defendant should be sustained.

'I1'he Court erred in not admitting certain evidence
and did not use the correct measure of damages.
The defendant \vas a contract carrier. It would only
be liable if it were negligent. There \vas no finding of
negligence although trial court was asked to do so if
any negligence. Therefore the trial court erred in entering judgment in favor of the plaintiff.
·The judgment in favor of the plaintiff should be
reversed.
Respectfully submitted,

GOLDEN W. ROBBINS
Attorney for the Defendant a;nd
Third-Party

Pla~nt~ff

711 Boston Building
Salt Lake City, Utah
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